European Intervention Initiative is different from the EU initiative on Permanent Structured Cooperation in the Field of Defense (PESCO) and the idea of creating a common European army. Undertaking additional commitments jeopardizes the implementation of strategic priorities for the countries and further exacerbates the fragile and insufficient military budgets.
well as a perspective view of the geopolitical and geo-economic interests in which the United States is the main and more important economic opponent of China, not the political enemy Russia, which should be temporarily only isolated and blocked.
More importantly, thinking as a businessman, Trump wants to stop Nord Stream-2 in order to take control of the European energy market and ensure the supply of liquefied gas. He also worries about the huge losses that have emerged from the denial of US arms procurement. The Italian government, for example, questioned the deal for 90 F-35 fighters, initially even 131 planes for $ 14 billion. It is also understandable that the EU countries, focusing on their own projects and reducing the purchase of US arms, are also concerned by the EU's ongoing Permanent Structured Co-operation and Defense Industry Fund All this has led to the vote of the Declaration of the Summit, in which a significant place is devoted to Russia, to which many accusations have been made and a definite critique of the Crimea has been expressed. However, NATO remains "open for an open, regular and meaningful dialogue at the NATO-Russia Council," and the terms used as "partnership" and "strategic importance" of the same are indicative and promising.
Strengthening the military presence in the Eastern Sea and the Black Sea does not promise a step towards a dilapidated relationship with Russia.
However, it is extremely worrying that, without any discussion, the text on hybrid threats, which triggered Article 5 of the Treaty, a military response to help the affected state because it sharply drops the threshold of a hot war. Neither the hybrid actions of rebels nor the non-directional cyber attacks would be credible evidence to be held responsible for a reprehensible military response.
In the light of what has been said so far, an initiative by France and its President Emmanuel Macron, with which nine European countries announced the creation of a European Intervention Initiative (EII) on 25 June, sounds quite reasonable. These are Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the initiator France. This military co-operation structure was presented as allowing collective action in response to a crisis situation such as engaging in a warring country or providing support in the event of a natural disaster. Italy also agreed to participate in the group of nine countries, but the new government has asked for time to explore the options.
The project was first announced in a speech by the French president in the Sorbonne in September last year, designed to boost European integration and develop its concept of European sovereignty as an alternative to national sovereignty. The aim of the new military alliance is to respond to crises near the borders of Europe without NATO or the United States. Macroe's idea is also to keep Britain engaged in European defense and after Breckit. In the words of the French Minister of Defense, cooperation is "between countries with political will and military intervention capacity if necessary". The idea is backed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, which is why Germany is one of the participating countries. The coalition is said to be ready to respond to crises without the help of NATO or the United States.
At first glance, it seems that the initiative is a likely step towards the creation of a common European army that EC President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed in March 2015, but a careful analysis shows that this initiative is rather against the general interests of The EU.
The project comes as a result of the need for a new approach due to the fact that the EU can not meet its defense ambitions and its commitments to increase military capabilities. Being ashamed of their collective inability to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo without US aid, the European leaders in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council set a goal to build a fully capable army of 60,000 by 2003. Fifteen years later, this "rapid reaction force" is still hypothetical, and in recent years European "battle groups" have not been used to resolve any conflict.
It is right to ask what the real purpose of this new group is, what are the criteria for inviting it to join. On what principle are invitations to selected countries? "
The initiative argues that this new intervention group outside the European Union, at crisis points outside the Union, is a new coalition of the willing. Looking from the perspective of a country such as the Republic, Bulgaria, which is a member of the EU and of NATO and a small country with relatively limited military capabilities, it is a new succession of division. And with a careful reading of the non-pepper of this new initiative, it is clear that it develops entirely outside the framework of the European Union's common security and defense policy. This is about much bigger changes within the EU, the formation of a new European strategic culture, the exchange of intelligence in this new framework, the strategic analyzes and plans planned in this new framework, the exchange of directives and doctrines in this new framework framework and for joint preparation within it.
The question arises as to how this will affect NATO, PESKO and, above all, the countries that remain outside this group. This is a new regional format, respectively for new dividing lines. Ie. the unity of the Union as such, including the implementation of the European security and defense policy, and of course the latest initiative under the structured cooperation that was announced in December at the EU Summit.
This initiative gives a clear signal that the European defense system faces a new turning point. A number of European leaders have allowed themselves to make unacceptable statements until yesterday that "Europe can not rely more on others and have to take security in their own hands."
What are the pros and cons of this initiative?
Pros of the initiative (Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018, pp.473-476; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018a, pp. 477-481; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018b, pp.487-491; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018c, pp.492-496; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018d, pp.501-504; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018e, pp.497-500; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018f, pp.505-510; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018g, pp.482-486; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018h, pp.511-516; Terziev, Petkov, Krastev, 2018i, pp.517-521) First of all, there is an expectation that the readiness of the forces of the countries involved in this initiative will be strengthened and the modernization of the armed forces of the participating countries will be facilitated. They will be forced to allocate more funds and consequently to realize new defense capabilities through the realization of the project for modernization of the armed forces. This is particularly about the modernization of Germany, which has come out really scary, not just the German public, details about the state of the armed forces.
Secondly, this initiative is perceived as a real step towards more security for Europe, no matter how it sounds to other EU member states at this time.
Thirdly, there will be opportunities for a rapid reaction if necessary, as in this case the unanimous decision of all EU Member States will not be sought. Тhis will be a peculiar instrument of military intervention for a group of countries where the decision is taken by a majority. Оne of Germany's concerns about cases of blocking decisions taken by a single country on military or civilian intervention in cases of evacuation or, say, a natural disaster, is eliminated.
Last but not least, this is an initiative that is seen as an opportunity for UK participation after its departure from the EU, but which, despite its departure, wants to keep its access to the Union database, intelligence exchange and agreements to jointly develop different weapons.
These are part of the pros and cons of the initiating countries and the participants in this initiative.
What are the minuses?
First of all, there is a duplication of initiatives in the field of European defense and security. It is about PESCO -the constantly structured cooperation, including with regard to the PESCO projects. Since the beginning of the year, 17 multinational projects have been implemented within the framework of PESKO, with Bulgaria participating in three of them.
Second is the focus of attention by launching different initiatives. And through the involvement of different groups of countries in different formats, including, of course, within the EU.
Third is the creation of new regional formats and new dividing lines, respectively.
Next is the scattering of forces and resources. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the efforts being made within the EU is low.
And, of course, not least, the initiative shows that there are differences in approaches, in the strategic culture of member states in relation to different crisis situations. For example, whether and when EU military intervention is needed in which part of the world and under what circumstances?
The careful review shows that the importance of these minuses prevails over the positive expression of the initiative.
Another important and unresolved issue, both in NATO and in the EU, which leads to the desire of individual countries to create their own military alliances, is the lack of clear requirements on spending defense money.
In general, for Bulgaria we can reduce these fundamental requirements to three: to spend enough on defense (measured as a percentage of GDP); to seriously consider its modernization with a view to creating usable armed forces (measured by means of invested military means); to be ready to use these armed forces (percentage of deployed military personnel during an operation).
Criteria for assessing the effectiveness of these requirements are:
1. "Political Adequacy" -the degree of alignment of military strategy with political goals and ambitions. Political ambitions define the political framework and in it the balance of the objectively required relative share of the military factor in the common defense efforts and the cost of its maintenance.
2. "Military Necessity" -to what extent established (planned) defense capabilities contribute (may contribute) to achieving the desired military-strategic results.
3. "Reachability" -compares assessments, mechanisms and approaches to developing the Armed Forces with available resources to meet defense needs.
4. Simultaneously with the evaluation of the achievement of the desired final result, evaluate the resources invested and the extent to which each additional lev in the defense has defensive capabilities.
5. It is imperative to assess progress with regard to:
• Implementation of the current programming documents and plans for the development of the Armed Forces;
• Level of achievement of the NATO Capabilities Capabilities Package 2017, including quantitative and qualitative indicators, and capabilities under the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU, incl. and Permanent, Structured Cooperation;
• Achieving NATO-wide targets on the usability of the armed forces in operations;
• Implementation of the country's commitments under the Permanent, Structured Cooperation to the CPSD, in line with the commitments made under the EU CPSD in the field of defense.
 The unequal status of the various EU Member States, both economically and politically, leads to different understandings regarding the Common European Security and Defense Policy and to different spending demands and the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of these requirements. The result of these differences is the attempts of individual member states to make different unions of interest (Terziev, Georgiev, 2018j, pp. 452-461; Banabakova, Georgiev, 2018k, pp. 468-483; Terziev, Nichev, Stoyanov, Georgiev, 2017, pp. 690-694; Terziev, Banabakova, Latyshev, Georgiev, 2017a, pp. 773-791; Terziev, Georgiev, 2017b, pp. 602-606; Kanev, Terziev, 2017c; Terziev, 2017d; Terziev, Madanski, Kanev, 2017e; Terziev, Banabakova, Georgiev, 2017f, pp 256-258; Terziev, Banabakova, Georgiev, 2017g, pp. 259-260; Terziev, Banabakova, Georgiev, 2017h; , pp. 261-262) . 
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